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One does not typically expect civil code interferences in public 
affairs. However, the case of McGraw v. City of New Orleans1 illus-
trates how the classification of property and the civilian doctrine of 
negotiorum gestio interact with local governance.  
I. BACKGROUND 
In the United States, monuments, statues, and other markers that 
depict controversial Confederate figures are being removed from 
public areas.2 In this case, Mitchell Landrieu, the Mayor of New 
Orleans, signed a city ordinance, enacted on December 18, 2015, 
that provided for the removal of three monuments that memorialized 
                                                                                                             
 *   J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May 2020) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisi-
ana State University. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor 
Olivier Moréteau for his guidance throughout the writing of this case note. 
 1. McGraw v. City of New Orleans, 16-446 (La. App. 4 Cir. 03/29/17); 215 
So. 3d 319. 
 2. Jess Bidgood et al., Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across 
the United States. Here’s a List, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc 
/3YPA-TAED.  
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former leaders of the Confederate States of America.3 Landrieu, 
whose father was the mayor of New Orleans during desegregation 
in the 1970s, faced tremendous pushback. He ultimately went 
through with his plan to remove the monuments because, as he put 
it, “[a] house divided against itself cannot stand, but to heal our di-
visions we must be able hear one another, see one another, under-
stand one another and feel one another.”4 Since the conclusion of 
the lawsuit, all three monuments were removed as of May 20, 2017.5 
Pierre McGraw was the president of a group who opposed re-
moval of these Confederate monuments. Mr. McGraw had previ-
ously invested his own time and money into the maintenance and 
upkeep of the monuments.  
The removal by the Mayor and the city council was authorized 
by article VII, Chapter 146 of the city’s codified ordinance. The or-
dinance allows for removal of public monuments, plaques, or other 
works of art when certain requirements are met. First, the structure 
must constitute a nuisance such that it praises ideologies in conflict 
with the equal protection of citizens. Second, the site of the structure 
must have been, or may become, an area of violent demonstration. 
Finally, the structure’s maintenance or security costs must be 
weighed against any historic or architectural significance it might 
have. If all requirements are met, the monument will be removed 
from public and placed in an indoor facility such as a museum, 
stored, or otherwise disposed.6 
The first monument at issue enshrined P.G.T. Beauregard, a gen-
eral in the Confederate army who was born on the outskirts of New 
Orleans. Beauregard was depicted wearing his Confederate uniform 
atop a horse, and the monument was located in an entrance to a city 
                                                                                                             
 3. The city ordinance sought to remove four monuments, however only 
three of the four are the subject of this suit. 
 4. MITCH LANDRIEU, IN THE SHADOW OF STATUES: A WHITE SOUTHERNER 
CONFRONTS HISTORY 5-7 (Penguin 2018). 
 5. Tegan Wendland, With Lee Statue’s Removal, Another Battle Of New Or-
leans Comes To A Close, NPR (May 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/H6WP-MFNN. 
 6. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE ORDINANCES § 146-611 (1956) [hereinafter 
CODE ORDINANCES], https://perma.cc/8PQR-QAHM. 
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park. The monument was paid for with private funds and was pub-
licly dedicated in 1915. Since its dedication, it had been maintained 
through both public and private funds. 
The second monument honored Jefferson Davis, the only presi-
dent of the Confederate States of America. During the construction 
process, the street the monument was to be placed on was renamed 
Jefferson Davis Parkway. The monument was built by a private as-
sociation and was publicly dedicated in 1911.  
The third monument venerated Robert E. Lee, the commander 
of the Confederate army. This monument depicted Lee in his Con-
federate uniform atop a monolith in middle of a public square. The 
monument was authorized by the city in 1877, and although built by 
a private organization, it was donated to the city and publicly dedi-
cated in 1884. Since that time, both public and private funds main-
tained the monument.  
Since 1989, Mr. McGraw has invested his time, money, and la-
bor into the monuments. He did so after learning that the city did not 
provide funding for their maintenance. In an affidavit, he stated that 
he devoted hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars to the mon-
uments’ upkeep. Further, he averred that he did this out of a sense 
of civic duty and for their historical preservation.  
Shortly after the passage of the ordinance, various groups 
brought a suit in federal district court in an attempt to halt the re-
moval of the Confederate statutes.7 The day after a federal district 
judge denied the groups’ injunctive relief claim, Mr. McGraw 
brought this suit for injunctive relief in the Civil District Court for 
the Parish of Orleans. At the hearing for preliminary injunction, the 
district judge denied Mr. McGraw’s request because the city fol-
lowed the strict mandates of their own ordinance and Mr. McGraw 
could not show that he had any property rights vested in the monu-
ments. It is from this judgment that Mr. McGraw sought appeal. He 
                                                                                                             
 7. Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx, 16-12495 (E.D. La. 2016); 
157 F. Supp. 3d 573. 
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argued that he had acquired vested property rights in the monuments 
by operation of negotiorum gestio because he invested his time and 
money into maintenance of the monuments, and thus, without in-
junctive relief halting the removal of the monument, he would suffer 
irreparable harm.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, in avoiding the politics of 
the situation, limited its ruling to “whether the district judge erred in 
denying Mr. McGraw’s request for preliminary injunction.”8 The 
court addressed Mr. McGraw’s claims of negotiorum gestio, his 
constitutional vested rights claim,9 and whether the record estab-
lished that the monuments were public things. In sum, the Fourth 
Circuit found “regardless of the theory advanced by Mr. McGraw, 
he has failed to establish that he acquired any type of vested property 
right in the monuments at suit.”10 Therefore, he could not prove that 
he would suffer any irreparable harm through their removal, and he 
was not entitled to preliminary injunction.  
The court correctly noted that the rules governing the doctrine 
of negotiorum gestio are found in Title V, Book III of the Civil 
Code. Negotiorum gestio or management of affairs is “when a per-
son, the manager, acts without authority to protect the interests of 
another, the owner, in the reasonable belief that the owner would 
approve of the action if made aware of the circumstances.”11 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the doctrine applies only when the manager 
acts for the benefit of the owner. In contrast, ownership in the Civil 
Code is defined as “the right that confers on a person direct, imme-
diate, and exclusive authority over a thing.”12 After reviewing these 
                                                                                                             
 8. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 323. 
 9. Because this claim is not rooted in civilian theory, it will not be discussed 
further.  
 10. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 332.  
 11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292 (2018). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 477 (2018). 
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articles, the court concluded “the doctrine of negotiorum gestio con-
fers no ownership rights upon the manager . . . . At most, the man-
ager who acts as a prudent administrator acquires a right of reim-
bursement against the owner.”13 
Although Mr. McGraw did not argue the issue, the court con-
cluded that the monuments were public things held by the city, a 
political subdivision, in its public capacity. The court noted that 
Civil Code article 448 divides things into the categories of common, 
public, and private. Further, the court restated article 450 paragraph 
1 that “[p]ublic things are owned by the state or its political subdi-
visions in their capacity as public persons” and paragraph 3 of the 
same article that “[p]ublic things that may belong to political subdi-
visions of the state are such as streets and public squares.” Using 
these articles, the court concluded that “the monuments at issue are 
public things given that the undisputed evidence clearly establishes 
that they were erected on public property, owned by the city in its 
public capacity, and subsequently dedicated to public use.”14 As 
such, the monuments were “inalienable, imprescriptible and exempt 
from seizure.”15  
III. COMMENTARY 
This commentary will first discuss the codification, application, 
and incompatibility with ownership of the civilian doctrine of nego-
tiorum gestio. Next, a more thorough analysis of the court’s conclu-
sion that the monuments were obviously public things is warranted. 
The court did not address that although a public thing is held in pub-
lic capacity, it is possible to change from the public to the private 
domain.  
                                                                                                             
 13. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 330. 
 14. Id. at 332. 
 15. Id.  
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A. Negotiorum Gestio 
The civilian doctrine of negotiorum gestio is codified in Title V, 
Book III of the Civil Code. As article 2292 indicates, negotiorum 
gestio requires a manager, or a person who “acts without authority 
to protect the interest of another,” and an owner, or a person whose 
affairs are being managed. Further, article 2292 requires the man-
ager to have “the reasonable belief that the owner would approve of 
the action if made aware of the circumstances.”16 In addition, article 
2294 requires the manager “give notice to the owner” and “wait for 
directions of the owner, unless there is immediate danger.”  
The doctrine of negotiorum gestio has its roots in early Roman 
Law.17 Originally, an intervenor, or gestor, would not be able to re-
cover reimbursement when they intervened to help another, and 
therefore, an individual would not feel compelled to be altruistic to 
their neighbor.18 Thereafter, the doctrine of negotiorum gestio was 
born through an action called actio negotiorum gestorum contraria, 
and on account of this action, a voluntary intervenor could receive 
reimbursement through a court if they voluntarily, altruistically 
managed the affairs of another.19 The Louisiana Civil Code adopted 
the doctrine based on “[a]ltruism, the duty or need to help and assist 
others.”20 
The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that negotiorum gestio 
does not impart the manager with any ownership rights. Further, it 
is does not seem likely that Mr. McGraw established that he man-
aged the affairs of the city as required by the Civil Code.  
At the outset, the length of time Mr. McGraw claims to manage 
the affair seems incompatible with the reason for the provision. Mr. 
McGraw maintained the monuments from 1989 until the beginning 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. at 330. 
 17. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN QUASI-
CONTRACTS 58 (Butterworth Legal Publ’g 1991).  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 58-59. 
 20. Id. at 68. 
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of suit at issue.21 This appears to be contrary to the notice to owner 
requirement in article 2294. Further, the notice requirement im-
plores the manager to wait for direction from the owner, unless there 
is a case of immediate danger. The facts of this case do not clarify if 
notice was adequately given, and it seems illogical that an event of 
immediate danger would span a period of more than twenty-five 
years.  
Unless an emergency occurred that required citizen intervention, 
the general maintenance and upkeep of public monuments also ap-
pears contrary to the spirit of negotiorum gestio. Although the Civil 
Code does not give an exhaustive list of the types of affairs that may 
be managed, revision comment (b) to article 2292 suggests that the 
“affair managed may be a material act, such as the protection of 
property from fire or flood, or the execution of a juridical act, such 
as the sale of perishable things.” These examples reflect a dire situ-
ation in which the affair must be managed in order to save it. Alt-
hough maintenance is a material act, it is not of the same character 
as protection from fire or flood.  
Finally, and most glaringly, to be reimbursed under negotiorum 
gestio, the manager cannot act with his own interest in mind.22 Here, 
Mr. McGraw testified that “[h]is actions were motivated out of a 
sense of civic concern, historical preservation, and filial duty, given 
that several of his ancestors served under both Generals Beauregard 
and Lee.”23 While civic concern may fit into the city’s interest, it 
appears far more likely that Mr. McGraw acted because of his an-
cestors’ service. Thus, Mr. McGraw would not have been acting for 
the benefit of the city’s interest but, instead, for his own benefit as 
illustrated by the affidavit he submitted to the court.24 
It is not clear that Mr. McGraw would have been able to benefit 
from reimbursement if he tried to recover under negotiorum gestio. 
                                                                                                             
 21. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 325-26.  
 22. See Kirkpatrick v. Young, 83-CC-2627 (La. 09/10/1984); 456 So. 2d 622; 
see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292 (2018), comment (d). 
 23. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 326.  
 24. Id. at 325-26. 
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To be doubly sure, the Fourth Circuit also concluded that the point 
was moot because the monument was a public thing held in public 
capacity. However, this conclusion is not as easily reached as their 
findings related to negotiorum gestio.  
B. Classification of Property 
The Louisiana Civil Code separates property, which is not com-
mon into that which is public and that which is private. However, 
the 1978 revision of the Civil Code dispensed with the classification 
of property into separate domains, and instead, classifies noncom-
mon property as either public things or private things.25 When prop-
erty is a public thing, the classification can be further subdivided 
into things that are public through constitutional or legislative pro-
visions or things that are public because they are owned by the state 
and put to a public purpose.26 Further, the state or its political sub-
divisions may own private things in their capacity as private per-
sons.27 Therefore, the classification of property owned by the state 
depends on the use and pertinent provisions of law because the state 
may hold property in either its public or private capacity.  
The Fourth Circuit relied on jurisprudence that had previously 
interpreted article 450 to include public parks as a thing that the city 
owned in its public capacity.28 With respect, the court could have 
conducted a more thorough examination of the city’s capacity in 
which it held the monuments. Article 450 paragraph 3 states the fol-
lowing: “[p]ublic things that may belong to political subdivisions of 
the state are such as streets and public squares” (emphasis added). 
The use of the word may indicates that the listed items are not de-
                                                                                                             
 25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2018). 
 26. Id. at art. 450 (2018), comment (c).  
 27. Id. at art. 453 (2018). 
 28. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 331-32.  
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terminate of public capacity. Therefore, if a political subdivision ter-
minates public use, the street or public square would be a thing 
owned by the political subdivision in its private capacity.29  
The Second Circuit has previously held that “[w]hen the politi-
cal subdivision formally determines that the thing dedicated to pub-
lic use is no longer needed by the public, the thing ceases to be pub-
lic and becomes a private thing of the political subdivision.”30 This 
holding suggests that the time the political subdivision “formally de-
termines” that a thing is no longer needed for public use is when the 
thing ceases to be public. This proposition, however, is only persua-
sive and has no support in the text of the Civil Code. Here, the New 
Orleans City Council voted to remove the monuments from public 
display.31 Given that the city council followed the procedures set in 
place for removal, it may seem to appear that they “formally deter-
mined” that the monuments were no longer needed by the public.  
Upon close inspection of the removal ordinance, subsection (d) 
provides that the removed monument “may be displayed indoors at 
an appropriate facility, such as a museum or stored, donated . . . or 
otherwise disposed.”32 If displayed in a public museum, the monu-
ment would remain public.33  
The monuments at issue were clearly public things held in public 
capacity for the years they stood undisturbed in the city’s parks. 
However, once the city enacted the removal ordinance, it began a 
process to remove the monuments from the public, and thus, a pro-
cess that might change the status of the monuments from public to 
                                                                                                             
 29. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE—
PROPERTY § 3:8 (5th ed., West 2015). 
 30. Walker v. Coleman, 20309-CA (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 2/22/1989); 540 So. 
2d 983, 985-86. 
 31. McGraw, 215 So. 3d at 323-24. 
 32. See CODE ORDINANCES, supra note 6. 
 33. There is room for debate, at least in Louisiana, if the museum charges an 
entrance fee. In Landry v. Council of East Baton Rouge Parish (La. Ct. App. 1st 
Cir. 4/14/1969); 220 So. 2d 795, 801, the First Circuit held that public property is 
open to all people “indiscriminately and without charge and which serve no quasi-
commercial or proprietary purpose.” France has many public museums charging 
an entrance fee but nobody would dispute that the exhibits are public things. 
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private. The text of the article is not clear, if a public thing becomes 
private when the formal determination is made or when the thing is, 
in fact, removed from the public space. Only persuasive authority 
exists on the topic, and the court did not entertain the possibility that 
the monument could have become a private thing when the city 
passed the ordinance. Therefore, it is not clear if the monuments 
were correctly determined to be public things held in public capac-
ity, or if the monuments cease to be public things as soon as a legal 
act is taken, possibly to the contrary.  
